

SPAIN, CUBA, 



THE UNITED STATES. 



RECOGNITION AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 



AMERICUS. 



'Tha aim which wo have in view is to place ourselves on a level with the most advanced nations" 

Spanish Peoyjbional Guv't. Ajjbkesb 



NEW YORK: 
PRINTED BY O. A. ALVOED, 15 VANDEWATEE STREET. 

' 1870. 




SPAIN, CUBA, 



THE UNITED STATES. 



RECOGNITION AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 



AMEEICUS.: 



" The aim which we have in view is to place ourselves on a level with the most advanced nations/ 1 

Spanish Provisional Gov't Address. 



NEW YORK: 
TRINTED BY C. A. ALVORD, 15 VANDEWATER STREET. 

1S70. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



I. The American Policy 3 

II. Our Relations with Spain 6 

III. Situation in Cuba and Recognition. . . . . . . - 14 

IV. Monroe Declaration and its Application 24 

V. Extracts from American Statesmen 33 



Ss 






SPAIN, CUBA, 



THE UNITED STATES. 



I. SPAIN, CDBA, AND THE UNITED STATES. 

The United States, under all circumstances, have refused to inter- 
vene in the internal affairs of other nations. They have uniformly 
maintained the strict policy of non-intervention during the entire 
existence of the nation, thus following out the wise policy estab- 
lished by Washington under his beneficent administration. During 
this period, there have been great occasions to induce a departure 
from this policy of the Republic, especially when Spanish America 
was dismembered, and this people, following our example, renounced 
all political connection with Spain, and founded several sister re- 
publics. But, adhering firmly to our early policy, we maintained 
it during all these exciting struggles for free governments on this 
continent; and, in order to check a threatened intervention by 
allied Europe, being then encouraged by England, we announced the 
policy now known as the Monroe doctrine, which is, opposition to 
any European intervention in the affairs of America. Considering 
the weakness of the then United States, in 1823, it was a brave 
protest against the threatened action of the Holy Alliance, in refer- 
ence to the affairs of the South American States, and, united to the 
attitude of England, it checked that threatened interference. Since 
that time, and while we were almost broken up by our late convul- 
sion, France, England, and Spain in vaded Mexico to compel redress 
of national grievances ; but Spain and England immediately with- 
drew from Mexico when they discovered that Napoleon had other 
views, and had broken the Convention of London, upon which the 
intervention was founded. That intervention is too fresh to be nar- 
rated. It caused the disastrous attempt of Maximilian to found a 
monarchy upon Mexican soil, and the final withdrawal of the 
French, and his melancholy death. This was the first, and it doubt- 
less will be the last, European intervention in America, for the 



4 

Napoleon dynasty is now tottering under the discontent of France. 
But America will not soon forget the noble and manly letter of the 
commander of the Spanish forces, General Prim, addressed to Napo- 
leon, dissuading him from the attempt to impose a monarchy upon 
the Mexican people; and had Napoleon followed the advice of that 
letter it would have saved France not a little humiliation, and 
have kept Napoleon from the first step in his decadence and fall. 
Such deception, intrigue, and failure lowered him in the eyes of 
France, and he is at present saving his own throne by slowly yield- 
ing to extorted concessions. It is now an opportune moment for 
his late private secretary, Mr. Lagueronniere, to issue another able 
pamphlet in vindication of the Napoleonic policy of Mexican inter- 
vention and recognition of the Confederate States, in order to dis- 
member and check the growth of the United States. But in the 
turn of events General Prim now exercises great power in Spain, 
and let him not forget the advice he gave Napoleon in 1862, and 
act upon those principles, and he will once more prove himself wise 
and firm, and fitted to act a great part in the affairs of Spain. He 
will not thus overlook the crime of Napoleon III., and will draw a 
lesson from this historic event of a ruler thus attempting to impose 
governments upon an unwilling people, and he may thus profit 
by that example, and apply it to the situation in Spain at this 
juncture. 

General Prim, and those acting with him, must observe that this 
is an age full of political change. The London Times, in its retro- 
spect on the past year, remarks that wherever we turn among the 
States of Europe we see governments in transition It is plain 
to ordinary vision that mankind are advancing in civil affairs, and 
will demand the rights of men, or u the right to be well governed," 
as Charles James Fox well said in the last century. Thus nations 
must be ruled henceforth, and intervention can not stop it in the 
Old or New World, whether on American or European soil. So the 
age of Holy Alliance is gone, and there will be few more interven- 
tions by monarchies to repress free nations. The future rather por- 
tends that the nations will intervene to be rid of despots. Look at 
France, at England, Austria, Italy, Spain, and the United States ; 
they all demand reform, and it can not be longer delayed. Not a na- 
tion in Europe but is liberalizing its constitution, and America has 
j ust proclaimed universal emancipation, and has equalizing the rights 
of men under revision. Everywhere monarchs are conceding to the 
people, and our American example is thus changing the world, and 
that without any intervention in the internal affairs of other na- 
tions. Thus the age of the Holy Alliance and the repression 
of liberal government is at an end. And what a cycle of events 
from the Holy Alliance to this day ! and what a change has come 
over the world ! It w T as despotic; it is now free; not absolutely, 
but comparatively free. 

Spain now finds this free spirit renovating her institutions. Ani-* 
mated by this spirit, Spain is reconstituting herself, and holding 



her colonies under a new and invigorated system of government. 
Yes, this ancient Spain, that once saw Roman grandeur dominate 
over her soil, and afterward held sway over half of Europe, while she 
colonized the New World, was in turn destined to decadence, until 
she sank to a second rank among the States of Europe. Through 
misfortune and misgovernment she hastened the loss of her great 
European and American provinces, which are never held long to 
advantage by any State. Such was the history of French coloniza- 
tion ; but English colonization, however, appeared more advanta- 
geous ; yet the American colonies caused her a seven years' war, and 
their final loss. Spain clung to her colonies with pride and firmness. 
They were, however, too strong for the parent country, and she, 
like England, was forced to submit to their loss. Thus her South 
American colonies and Mexico became free States, and have been 
mainly distracted with civil wars ever since. Not any of these 
States have shown requisite stability, or that they possessed the 
elements of true and advanced civilization. They are want- 
ing in the vital principle of order and cohesion, and afford 
little security to life and property. It is to be hoped that these 
States will yet reach these necessary conditions of a free State. 
Order is the first law of nature, and without this there can be no 
stable government in the world. That is a primary condition in 
every State. 

Tims Spain has been taught by historic events that no country 
can long hold distant colonies when they become strong and self- 
reliant ; and now she realizes that it is even wise to liberalize 
her policy toward Cuba and Porto Rico, although their strength 
could not long resist her power. She, however, comprehends that 
these colonies have been in the' past alienated by the misgovern- 
ment of the recent dynasties, and she proposes to correct that at the 
earliest moment, and that as soon as Cuba shall accept the new 
order of things in Spain. That is the voice of Spain speaking to 
Cuba amidst the clangor of arms ; and that voice will yet be heard 
when it is seen that independence is a dream and not a reality. It 
is said by the Cortes that Spain carries the olive branch entwining 
the sword, and Cuba will yet listen to the counsels of peace. That 
policy is commended by foresight and statesmanship, and will 
mitigate the calamities of civil strife, if firmly applied by those 
who are now directing the affairs of Spain. 

Spain founded a provisional government in October, 1868, and it 
was first recognized by the United States. That recognition was 
unhesitatingly given as soon as the new government was estab- 
lished by the expulsion of Queen Isabella with the full acquiescence 
of the people. Immediately after, it was declared that an election 
would be held for the purpose of electing a Cortes with power to 
frame a new constitution, and that that body would be chosen by 
universal suffrage. The election was held, and a new constitution 
was framed and adopted. It is the freest and most liberal constitu- 
tion now existing in any state in Europe. The people have been 



6 

liberated under this new constitution, and freedom of the press, of 
speech and religion everywhere prevails under this constitution, 
both in Spain and her colonies. All the Spanish colonies are granted 
representation upon the same basis as it prevails in Spain, a deputy 
in the Cortes to every 45,000 inhabitants. Since the establishment 
of this new and invigorated government, under the direction of the 
Cortes, there has been no little contention between parties as to 
what form of government should prevail, and as to who shall be 
king. It has thus become a very grave question in Spain, whether 
the people should not choose an executive head from her leading 
statesmen, rather than inaugurate a new king. Already there is a 
law expelling the Bourbons. Thus Spainjs much divided npon the 
question of administration, and it remaining unsettled, it is the 
principal cause of disturbance in Spain. If the Cortes should remit 
the whole question to the people, it would seem the most certain and 
sure way of settlement, and ought to appease all conflieting claims. 
But within ten days after the Spanish outbreak insurrectionary 
movements exhibited themselves in Cuba, and they made consider- 
able headway, owing to the distractions that existed in.Spain. They 
have so far been confined to portions of the Eastern and Central 
Departments of the island of Cuba. 

II.—- OUR RELATIONS WITH SPAIN* 

'Die Cuban Junta have been for some time past obtaining sig- 
natures to petitions to be flooded upon Congress at its opening, to 
the end that the Government of the United States shall recognize 
Cuba as a belligerent. These petitions have been extensively cir- 
culated, and they have been laid before Congress, with all the real 
and manufactured names that the Junta agents have affixed. Such 
petitions were expected to make a great stir in affairs at Washing- 
ton. Now we shall address a few considerations to sober-minded 
people, touching this policy of recognition of belligerency at this 
time. In this paper we shall not present the question of the right 
of the Government to recognize civil war in Cuba; but we shall 
consider the real relations we now hold to Spain as the last of the 
regenerated nations that has a liberal constitutional government for 
her people and colonies alike. 

Indeed, the world was not prepared to see Spain rise up of a sud- 
den, and strike down its ancient monarchy, and adopt one of the 
most liberal and democratic constitutions that now exist in the 
world ; and yet, while we were gazing upon this spectacle with 
astonishment, we saw the deposition of a queen and the adoption 
of universal suffrage, and of an elective government and adminis- 
tration by the Cortes. That form of elective government has now 
existed in Spain about one year, and has carried forward constant 
and continued reforms. It has established an elective government, 
free religion, free sehools, and free libraries, throughout the entire 
eontines of Spain. It has made it a part of the constitution that 



the colonies of Spain sliall have equal privileges, and shall be 
equally represented in the legislation of the nation. It has decreed 
and offered to the colonies a new system of laws and of government, 
Which shall be enacted by their own joint voice and after consulta- 
tion with them. Such is the entire change of the government of 
Spain, that she now proposes to make her colonies equal parts of 
herself, and to govern them upon the footing of equal laws. Such 
is the proposed policy that new Spain now offers Porto Rico and 
Cuba. But unfortunately for Spain, the same course that led to the 
overthrow of the monarch} 7 in Spain also led instantaneously to rev- 
olution in Cuba, and throwing off the home government. Cuba did 
not wait to see what might be done by the new order of things in 
Spain, but cast off her allegiance to Spain, and now seeks independ- 
ence of the mother country. The island has been about equally 
divided during the past year, and the insurrection is not yet ended. 
The natives are the revolutionary part} T , and the natives of Spain 
residing in Cuba are for Spain ; and had no recruiting gone to the 
assistance of the revolutionists from other parts of America, it is 
quite possible that the insurrection would now be suppressed. Much 
aid has been secured from the United States through sympathy and 
the love of adventure. Surely, those springing forward to the aid of 
the revolution have acted upon the misgovernment of Cuba by the 
old regime, or that they might share some of the spoils of antici- 
pated victory and independence of Cuba. 

Indeed, it must be said that the people of the United State;, re- 
membering the bad government that had affected equally Spain and 
Cuba in the past, sympathized with the revolutionists in this vigor- 
ous attempt to subvert Spain in Cuba. We think we may say this 
in justice to the people of the United States, who have always taken 
sides with attempts to establish liberal governments in the world. 
That is an instinctive and natural feeling of our democracy, and it 
makes itself usually felt against the old dynastic monarchies of En- 
rope. And so strong is this sentiment in America, that we have 
not paused to consider that Cuba has not been misgoverned by new 
Spain, but by the cast*off regime of an antiquated dynasty. All 
things have there been changed, and the people rule in regenerated 
Spain as certainly as in any country of the world ; since which free- 
dom is established and common schools likewise throughout Spain, 
and the people may now become universally educated. We do not 
say that Cuba should have waited to see what this new constiru- 
tional government would accomplish for her ; that was a matter for 
herself to decide ; but we say that Americans, accustomed to take a 
just and wide view of political affairs, should keep in mind the exi- 
gencies of Spain, and consider what we owe to both in this civil con- 
vulsion and strife. Certainly there are two sides to the question, 
and we must consider under all these exigencies in which we are 
called upon to act, what are our duties to Spain, ior'Cuba, and to 
ourselves. Surely, if we take a purely selfish an/i interested view 
of the question, it is likely we should disregard any claims that Spain 



has upon the United States, and promote the contest now going on in 
Cuba, even though it might prove terribly destructive to Cuba her- 
self. That would be our course did we wish to obtain Cuba at all 
hazards, by fair or by foul means. It is a grave matter for consid- 
eration — we mean our duty toward Spain and Cuba. At this time 
insurrection exists in Cuba, and it must win independence or be put 
down speedily. And now it is not for us, as a nation, to take sides 
with Cuba, for the reason that she may be crushed by war. She 
chose that peril in appealing to revolutionary measures, instead of 
accommodating herself to the new and liberal government now exist- 
ing in Spain ; she had not the prudence to wait for this reform. 
She hastily sought the opportunity of distraction in Spain to strike 
the blow that should sever her relations to Spain forever. She has 
chosen her course, and it is not for us to censure or advise her. 
She must abide her time, and deliver herself according to her 
strength, as all other peoples and nations have done in their trials 
and struggles for self-government. Cuba lies so near to our doors 
that we keep her in full view, and believe that she is, after all, des- 
tined to ultimately become a part of this republic. That is the un- 
doubted belief of our people, and it distorts our vision not a little 
when we consider our relations to Cuba and to Spain. Americans 
are human, and not less selfish than other peoples ; and this splen- 
did island jutting out a little from our coast, dazzles and benumbs 
our moral vision, and almost blinds us to the great events now going 
forward in Spain in behalf of free constitutional government, and 
makes us quite forget that this ancient and proud nation, after 
France, gave us most aid in establishing our own independence. 
When we go back to those times, and to the past and present of 
Spain, there is so much to excite our gratitude and hope, that we 
can see, after all, that Spain is quite as right in this contest for the 
retention of Cuba, as any nation can well be. We say this upon 
the new basis upon which Spain now rises up among- the free na- 
tions of the earth ; and this revolution will not end without restor- 
ing the old dynasty or a pure republic, and we believe the latter 
will prevail. They may elect their executive for life, but a consti- 
tutional republic is the necessity of Spain, and we do not mean that 
the United States shall now steal the best and brightest jewel from 
the republic of Spain. If we are to have Cuba, let us acquire her 
upon terms entirely unexceptionable, and without any bad faith to 
Spain. Less than this we can not afford, and less than this the peo- 
ple of the United States ought not to accept ; for we should do unto 
Spain as we would have had Spain do unto us, when we were in the 
war for our national supremacy. 

Such are the considerations that present themselves to our view 
at this juncture, when there is no certainty that Cuba can gain her 
independence ; and it is not for the United States to prolong the 
contest by unseemly recognition at this time. We have not suffi- 
cient evidence to hope that Cuba can win her independence, or 
even long oppose the power of Spain : and should we now inflame 



Cuba with misguided hope, leading her to great sacrifice, if not to 
inevitable destruction ? We are not prepared to take sides with her, 
and it is a matter of national policy whether we should now recog- 
nize her as a belligerent. We do not dispute the right of everv 
nation to thus recognize insurrection and war ; but it is a matter 
of prudence and duty to Spain, not to make this recognition before 
the facts of the contest warrant it under the laws of nations. As 
an independent nation we can make this recognition, however it 
might be unwarranted and unsustainable except upon a selfish 
basis. Indeed, Cuba has prolonged the contest up to this time, 
principally owing to the fact that Spain has been settling her own 
revolution upon a stable basis, against the struggles of monarchy- 
men and extreme republicans at home. Now she is concentra- 
ting her energies against the remaining insurrection in Cuba, and 
we who have just risen out of our own national war should not 
be too eager or too hasty to throw our influence in favor of the 
dismemberment of Spain. Such are the just views presented to our 
people at this juncture. 

We know, however, that men will clamor for the immediate re- 
cognition of Cuba as a belligerent, and then it will be urged that 
we must give our moral support to sustain the revolution in Cuba. 
We have maturely considered the whole question, and we see no 
opposing considerations that can break the force of our argument ; 
and thus we say, that the United States must sustain the policy to 
which we are pledged as a nation ; that while we would never 
consent to see Cuba transferred to some European power, at the 
same time we pledged ourselves never to rescue it from the hands 
of Spain. We were invited on a memorable occasion to become a 
party to a tripartite treaty, that pledged us, equally with France 
and England, never to acquire Cuba; but this pledge the United 
States respectfully declined in one of the most elegant State papers, as 
well as one of the best considered, that ever emanated from the late 
Edward Everett; and this policy thus established by the Fillmore 
administration, was afterward reaffirmed by Mr. Marcy, while he 
guided the affairs of State ; and so, we say, we are pledged by these 
diplomatic papers to maintain the supremacy of Spain over Cuba, 
by repressing all attempts of our people to rescue this island from 
the government and possession of Spain. We will now proceed 
more particularly to show what promises we have heretofore made 
to sustain Spain in her rightful possession of Cuba. We shall first 
premise that expeditions had been fitted out from the United 
States against the island of Cuba and were suppressed by the firm- 
ness of the Fillmore Administration, and these forays, led on by 
uneasy Cubans, caused the diplomatic proceedings to which we 
shall now more particularly refer. 

The fitting out of expeditions against Cuba in 1851, was made 
the apology for an intervention on the part of England and France, 
so. far as sending orders to their naval commanders to prevent by 
force the landing of adventurers on the island of Cuba, with hostile 



10 

intent. Both powers made known these instructions to the United 
States, and in reply to this oral communication of the British 
Charge d 1 Affairs, it was answered by the President that so far as 
relates to this Republic and its citizens, such an interference would 
be practically injurious in its consequences, and do more harm than 
good if admitted to be rightful in itself. Its execution would be 
the exercise of a sort of police over the seas in our immediate 
vicinity, and it would involve to some extent the exercise of a 
jurisdiction to determine what expeditions were of the charac- 
ter denounced, and who were the guilty adventurers engaged in 
them. 

In reply to the note of M. de Sartiges, Mr. Crittenden said: — 
" This intervention can not be viewed with indifference by the 
President. The position of Cuba, in the Gulf of Mexico, lying at no 
great distance from the mouth of the river Mississippi, and in the 
tine of the greatest current of the commerce of the United States, 
would become, in the hands of any powerful European nation, an 
object of just jealousy and apprehension to the people of this coun- 
try. A due regard to their own safely aud interest must, therefore, 
make it a matter of importance to those who shall possess and hold 
dominion over the island. The Government of France and those 
of other European States were long since apprised by this Govern- 
ment that the United States could not see, without concern, that 
island transferred by Spain to any other European State. Presi- 
dent Fillmore fully concurs in that sentiment, and is apprehensive 
that the sort of protectorate introduced by the order in question 
might, in contingencies not difficult to be imagined, lead to results 
equally objectionable.'" 

In reply to this note, October, 1851, M. de Sartiges said :-— 
" The French Government is likewise of the opinion that in case 
it should comport with the interests of Spain, at some future day, 
to part with Cuba, the possession of that island, or the protector- 
ship of the same, ought not to fall upon any of the great maritime 
powers of the world." 

This explanation ended with the declaration by France that this 
interference was only intended against pirates under the maritime 
code of France ! 

In 1852, the ministers of these two countries addressed notes and 
a draft for a tripartite convention to the Secretary of State, in 
which the three high contracting parties were to disclaim, k ' both 
now and forever hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the 
island of Cuba, and they respectively bind themselves to discoun- 
tenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or 
individuals whatever." These accompanying notes contained dis- 
claimers on the part of England and France of any intention, and 
referred to the previous course of the United States, and added that 
all the three powers disclaimed all thought of appropriating Cuba, 
and all that remained to be done was to give practical effect to the 
•views entertained in common by these powers. This they pro- 



r 11 

posed to do by the convention, or by the exchange of notes to that 
effect. 

In 1S52, Mr. Webster replied to the separate notes of M» de 
Turgot and the Earl of Malmesbury. 

'• It has," be said, " been stated, and often repeated to the Govern- 
ment of Spain by this Government, under various administrations, 
not only that the United States have no design upon Cuba them* 
selves, but that, if Spain should refrain from a voluntary cession of 
the island to any European power, she might rely on the con- 
tinuance and friendship op the United States, to assist her in 

THE DEFENSE AND PRESERVATION OF THAT ISLAND. At the Same 

time, it has always been declared to Spain that the Government of 
the United States could not be expected to acquiesce in the cession 
of Cuba to any European power. The present Executive of the 
United States entirely approves of this past policy of the Govern- 
ment, and fully concurs in the general sentiments expressed bv M. 
de Turgot, and understood to be identical with those entertained 
by the Government of Great Britain," 

He deemed it his duty at the same time to remind the ministers, 
and through them their governments, "that the policy of the 
United States has uniformly been to avoid, as far as possible, alli- 
ances or agreements with other States, and to keep itself free from 
international obligations, except such as affect directly the interests 
of the United States themselves," 

The French and English ministers, in July, 1852, again refer to 
the proposed convention, and explain the interests their govern- 
ments have in the island of Cuba, as standing in one of the great 
channels of the world's commerce, and also as to claims they have, 
as creditors of Spain, and add that it might be thought that the 
United States, by their declaration excluding other nations from 
profiting by the chances of future possible events, have not debar- 
red themselves by that declaration from availing themselves of such 
events. They declared, in conclusion that the convention had but 
two objects in view \— 

" The one a mutual renunciation of the future possession of 
Cuba j the other an engagement to cause this renunciation to be 
■/•expected.'''' 

Mr. Everett becoming Secretary of State, answers these precedent 
notes in December, 1852, to the effect that the President declines 
the invitation of France and England for the United States to be- 
come a party to the proposed convention, and adds that— 

" The President does not covet the acquisition of Cuba for the 
United States ; at the same time he considers the condition of Cuba 
as mainly an American question. 

" The proposed convention proceeds on a different principle. It 
assumes that the United States have no other or greater interest in 
the question than France or England ; whereas it is necessary only 
to cast one's eye on the map to see how remote are the relations of 
Europe, and how intimate those of the United States with the 



12 

island." He then adds, as one of the reasons of refusing to become 
a party to the convention, its certain rejection by the Senate, and 
he expresses a doubt — 

" whether the Constitution of the United States would allow the 
treaty-making power to impose a permanent disability^ on the Ame- 
rican Government, for all coming time, and prevent it from doing 
what has been so often clone in times past. In 1803, the United 
States purchased Louisiana of France, and in 1819 they purchased 
Florida of Spain. It is not within the competence of the treaty- 
making power, in 1852, effectually to bind the Government in all 
its branches, and for all coming time, not to make a similar pur- 
chase of Cuba. 

" Bat the President has a graver objection to entering into the 
proposed convention. He has no wish to disguise the feeling that 
the compact, although equal in its terms, would be very unequal 
in substance. France and England, by entering into it, would dis- 
able themselves from obtaining possession of an island remote from 
their seats of government, belonging to another European power, 
whose natural right to possess it must be as good as their own— a 
distant island in another hemisphere, and one which by no ordinary 
or peaceful course could ever belong to either of them. The United 
States, on the other hand, would, by the proposed convention, dis- 
able themselves from making an acquisition which might take place 
without any disturbance of existing foreign relations, and in the 
natural order of things. The island of Cuba lies at our doors. It 
commands the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes jlie 
shores of five of our States. It bars the entrance of that great river 
which drains half the North American continent, and with its trib- 
utaries forms the largest of internal water communications in the 
world. It keeps watch on the doorway of our intercourse with 
California and the Isthmus route." 

Mr. Everett finally says that the President is convinced that such 
a treaty would fail, but rather invite the repetition of lawless attacks 
upon Cuba by bands of adventurers, and would — 
" strike a death-blow to the Conservative policy hitherto pursued 
in this country toward Cuba." 

The two governments afterward protested against certain parts 
of the letter of Mr. Everett, and this led Mr.^Marcy, in 1853, to 
give certain instructions to our Minister to England, in which he 
approved of the rejection of the — 

" tripartite convention, for guaranteeing the Spanish dominion over 
Cuba," 
and said — 
" the proposition was very properly declined." 

He then reprehended the course' of England and France in send- 
ing their ships of war on to our coast during the late disturbances in 
Cuba, without previous notice to our Government, and said that for 
many reasons the United States feel a deep interest in the destiny 
of Cuba, and will never consent— 



13 

" to its transfer to either of the intervening nations, or to any other 
foreign state. They should regret to see foreign powers interfere to 
sustain Spanish rule in the island, should it provoke resistance too 
formidable to he overcome by Spain herself * * * We should 
Very much regret that the general condition of things in Cuba, or 
any particular occurrence there, should be such as to act so power- 
fully upon the feelings of individuals among us, as to impel them to 
an unlawful enterprises against that island ; but if, unhappily, that 
should be the case, the (government of the United States will do 

ITS WHOLE DUTY TO SPAIN, AND USB ALL THE REPRESSIVE MEANS 
AUTHORIZED BY LAW, OR RBQUIRED BY HONOR, TO RESTRAIN - OUR 
CITIZENS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF DUTY. In THIS RESPECT, SPAIN WILL 
HAVE NO GOOD CAUSE TO COMPLAIN, OR ANY OTHER NATION A FAIR 
OPPORTUNITY TO INTERFERE." 

The policy of the United States as to Cuba was fully disclosed' in 
the papers communicated by President Fillmore to Congress in 
July, 1852, and which comprised the correspondence on that sub- 
ject, going back to 1822. Our policy ever has been, that, while we 
were content that the Spanish island should remain with Spain, we 
would never infringe the obligations of good neighborhood to obtain 
them otherwise than by a voluntary cession by Spain ; yet we would 
never consent to see them pass into the hands of any maritime or Eu- 
ropean power. England and France have been constantly apprised 
of this, and as early as 1826, we announced to France " that the 
United btates couhl not see with indifference Porto Kico and Cuba 
pass from Spain into the possession of any other power," at the 
same time we declared to Spain that we could enter into no engage- 
ment of guaranty, as such a course was inconsistent with our 
standing rules of foreign policy. 

In the summer of 1854, there was a joint note upon the Cuban 
question by Buchanan, Mason, and Soule, emanating from Ostend, 
while they represented the United States at London, Paris, and 
Madrid, in which document they say : — 

" Our past history forbids that we shall acquire the island of 
Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law 
of self-preservation. We must, in any event, preserve our own con- 
scious rectitude and our self-respect. While pursuing this course, 
ive can afford to disregard the censure of the world, to which we have 
been so often and so unjustly exposed." 

Such is the tone of a celebrated paper that proposed, in case 
Spain would not consent to sell Cuba to us, to take into considera- 
tion whether the United States would not, in a certain emergency, 
to prevent certain calamities in Cuba — meaning emancipation 
therein — be justified to seize the island and appropriate it to our- 
selves, to prevent its becoming another St. Domingo. Now we 
have emancipationists urging on the Government to aid Cuba in 
the insurrection to produce this emancipation, which the celebrated 
Ostend diplomats so much deprecated, and which, in their judgment, 
would justify us in seizing Cuba to prevent that dreadful catastrophe. 



14 

Sneli is the turn of events that the two extremes have pushed, at 
different times, the seizure of Cuba for the most opposite reasons. 
So we say, in view of the settled and long-explained policy of the 
United States, that we can not now aid Cuba in her attempt at 
independence without violating our own declarations and pledges, 
made to Spain, and repeated during the last half century, touching 
our course as to the island of Cuba. 

We summarize this policy in these words : — 

1st. We have said that Cuba belongs to Spain, and, in consequence 
of her position to the United States, we can not consent to see her 
transferred to any other European power. 

2d. We have said that we will not in any manner covet Cuba, nor 
seek to rescue her from the lawful possession of Spain ; and will 
repress all attempts from our citizens to thus deprive Spain of her 
possession. 

Sd. We have said, in the language of the American Secretary of 
State, Mr. Webster, that if Spain should refrain from a voluntary 
cession of the island to any European power, she might rely on the 
countenance and friendship of the United States to assist her in the 
defense and preservation of thai island. 

Thus strong have been our engagements to Spain that we have 
even pledged ourselves to use all repressive measures warranted 
under the laws of nations to avert any attack from our shores upon 
the island of Cuba; and we have pledged our friendship and nation- 
ality to assist Spain in the defense and preservation of that island, 
in case she would refrain from ceding it to any European power. 
Spain has fully complied with the condition, and we are thus under 
the convention to aid her in keeping possession of Cuba, as against 
all external force, if not against insurrection likewise ; for the pledge 
was unconditional, and it is now completely operative. We are 
not to forget that we have assumed to control and dictate to Spain 
that this transfer could not be made to European powers, without 
incurring the protest, if not the hostility, of the United States, and 
we have said, in that connection : Eetain that island, and we pledge 
the friendship of the United States that your rights to Cuba shall 
not be disturbed, but we will aid you in defending this possession of 
Spain. Thus our present Administration find that the Government 
is under solemn guaranty not to aid any attempts to rescue this 
possession from Spain, but must exert its good faith and friendship 
to maintain the statu quo ante helium. 

III. RECOGNITION OF CUBA. 

Can the United States Government legally recognize Cuba as a 
belligerent, upon the facts of the case? In considering this question, 
we shall accept certain principles laid down in the papers, emanat- 
ing authoritatively from the Department of State, as sound law, bear- 
ingupon the question. We shall especially rely upon the latest ex- 
position of the Secretary of State, in his instructions to our Minister 



15 

to England, touching our claims against England for breach of neu- 
trality. In that paper our complaint is repeated that the recogni- 
tion of the Confederate States by Great Britain was unwarranted, at 
the time it was made ; was an act injurious to the United States, 
and so hasty as to appear unfriendly to us. It does not appear dis- 
tinctly whether Mr. Fish, like his predecessor, Mr. Seward, intends 
to press a reclamation for damages arising out of this premature 
and very hasty recognition, or whether our claim is now to be con- 
fined to reparation arising out of neutrality. This paper must 
necessarily limit the reclamation to the fact whether or not Great 
Britain discharged her obligations of a neutral, during the exist- 
ence of the late civil war, in which we were unfortunately 
involved. Our claim can have no more than this extent, upon the 
showing of the Department. This is apparent from the principle 
of law kid down by the Department, that— 

" The President does not deny, on the contrary he maintains, 
that every sovereign power decides for itself, on its own responsi- 
bility, the question whether or not it will, at a given time, accord 
the status of belligerency to the insurgent subjects of another 
power, as also the larger question of the independence of such sub- 
jects, and their accession to the family of sovereign States. But 
the rightfulness of such an act depends on the occasion and the cir- 
cumstances, and it is an act like the sovereign act of war, which 
the morality of the public law and practice requires should be 
deliberate, reasonable, and just, in reference to surrounding facts ; 
national belligerency, indeed, like national independence, being 
but an existing fact, officially recognized as such, without which 
such a declaration is only the indirect manifestation of a peculiar 
line of policy." 

Then it is correctly said that every sovereign nation must, upon 
its own responsibility, " accord the status of belligerency " to insur- 
gent subjects of another power, as also the greater question of the 
independence of such subjects. 

But it is also alleged that the rightfulness of such acts depends on 
the occasion and circumstances in reference to surrounding facts, 
and is like the sovereign act of war. 

Mr. Fish will find it laid down in the celebrated letter of Mr. 
Webster to Mr. Hulseman that — 

" If the United States had formally acknowledged the indepen- 
dence of Hungary, though no benefit would have resulted from it 
to either party, it would not have been an act against the law of 
nations, provided they took no part in her contest with Austria." 
- In 1848, a Provisional Government was formed in Hungary, and 
in 1849 Hungary made an attempt to become an independent State. 
This effort would probably have been successful had not Russia 
intervened at the request of Austria. The United States dis- 
patched an agent to the scene of war, for the purpose of " recogniz- 
ing Hungary as a new State, in the event of its ability to sustain 
itself." Mr. Hulseman, in his note said that this agent was 



1G 

exposed to be treated as a spy, to which Mr. Webster answered 
that the imputation was offensive, and had the Government of Aus- 
tria subjected Mr. Mann to the treatment of a spy, it would have 
placed itself outside the pale of civilized nations; and if it had 
attempted to carry into effect such lawless purpose, the people of 
this country would have demanded immediate hostilities to be 
.waged to the extent of the power of the Republic against Austria-. 

Mr. Webster then says that the steps taken by President Taylor 
were warranted by the law of nations, and were agreeable to the 
usages of civilized States. He then asserts the right of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States, as an independent nation, to form 
and express its opinion at all times upon the great political events 
\vhich transpire among the civilized nations of the earth. It was 
also declared that, not finding sufficient evidence that Hungary had 
become a " stable " power, the United States on that ground did 
not recognize her as a power among the nations. This negotiation 
explains our position upon two points, and which are sustained by 
the law of nations — our right to recognize new States, and that 
these new States must be " stdbUP before such recognition can be 
made. 

If we had no right to recognize Hungary, the complaint of Aus- 
tria was well taken. But as long as we took no part in the contest, 
we could commit no offense by the recognition of belligerency or 
of the independence of the new State. So we can not upon this 
principle claim any damages from Great Britain, for her act of 
recognizing the South as a belligerent in war, for no offense was 
committed under the law of nations. England made war against 
France for recognizing the independence of the United States, but 
it was justified solely on the ground that France became a party to 
the war and took sides with us. It would be a strange doctrine 
that a neutral is answerable in damages to a sovereign power, on 
the ground that it had unreasonably recognized its revolted subjects 
as a belligerent, or as an independent power. That would be a 
novel and dangerous principle to incorporate into the law of nations, 
and the United States should, as the great neutral power of the 
world, be the last to sustain it. Every sovereign power is answer- 
able for its obligations as a neutral, and that is the sole ground of 
the liability of Great Britain to us. Besides, if we take the position 
of Mr. Seward, that there was no civil w r ar, and the South was not 
a belligerent, then it must logically follow that England did not 
hold the position of a neutral, and was answerable only for the 
strict enforcement of her municipal laws; and we then must re- 
linquish the whole prize of war illegally taken. 

This is the position we hold to Spain at this moment. Our Gov- 
ernment finds Cuba in a state of insurrection, but not having 
reached a condition to be recognized as a belligerent; so it follows 
that there is no civil war, no belligerents, and hence there can be 
no neutrals ; and so, being at peace with Spain, we must enforce 
our laws against arming and fitting out military expeditions against 



17 

Spain. We are liable to Spain as a neutral, wlien she demands that 
Cuba shall be considered as a belligerent, and Spain shall notify the 
nations of that fact. Civil war is a fact. It is caused by a regular 
dispute by force, and this dispute receives its character from the 
contestants; and hence a neutral does not confer war powers. It 
merely recognizes the act of war. So far, Spain has refrained from 
asserting the rights of war against Cuba, and has treated the matter 
as a mere revolt. She has not asserted the right to blockade her 
porta, under the laws of nations, which would compel us to recog- 
nize that blockade, and the right to take prizes of war. The Cubans 
have no organized and stable government, no occupation of im- 
portant towns, and they carry on very irregular and spasmodic 
hostilities against the authority of Spain. Spain holds the main 
part of the island, and all its fortified places and cities. The insur- 
rection has no fixed seat of government ; it is wholly revolutionary 
in character. 

Such is the actual state of affairs in Cuba, and in view of these 
facts the Executive of the United States has said, in his message to 
( JongresSj that— 

" The people and the Government of the United States entertain 
ihe same warm feelings and sympathy for the people of Cuba, in 
their pending struggle, that they manifested throughout the previous 
struggles between Spain and her former colonies in behalf of the 
latter. But the contest has at no time assumed the conditions that 
amount to a war, in the sense of international law, or which would 
show the existence of a de facto political organization of the insur- 
gents, sufficient to justify a recognition of belligerency. The prin- 
ciple is maintained, however, that this nation is its own judge when 
to accord the rights of belligerency, either to a people struggling to 
free themselves from a Government they believe to be oppressive, or 
to independent nations at war with each other. The United Stares 
have no disposition to interfere with the existing relations of Spain, 
to her colonial possessions on this continent. They believe that, in 
due time, Spain and other European powers will find it their inter- 
est in terminating those relations and establishing their dependen- 
cies as independent powers— members of the family of nations. Tne 
dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one 
European power to another. When the present relations of colo- 
nies cease, they are to become independent powers, exercising the 
right of choice and of self-control in the determination of their fu- 
ture condition and relations with other powers." 

This position of President Grant is sustained by the uniform ac- 
tion of the Government hitherto, touching the recognition of new 
States and of insurrections. President Jackson, in his special mes- 
sage, in December, 1836, in relation to the recognition of Texas, 
thus refers to the principles on which the United States have 
acknowledged the independence of new States : — 

k ' All questions relative to the government of foreign States, 
whether of the Old or of the New World, have been treated by the 
2 



18 

United States as questions of fact only, and our predecessors have 
cautiously abstained from deciding upon them, until the clearest 
evidence was in their possession, to enable them not only to decide 
correctly, but to shield their decision from every unworthy imputa- 
tion." 

Let these principles be applied, and it is evident that the facts 
will not warrant at this time, the awarding to Cuba belligerent rights 
or the recognition of a de facto government. 

War must exist before there can be belligerent rights. War is 
a dispute by force of arms, and civil war comes from these disputes 
within the same State. But this is an insurrection until the State 
is broken up and its authority successfully disputed by an organized 
force, which finally compels the State to carry on regular war. So 
far, the Cubans have not compelled Spain to carry on regular war- 
fare, and they have no known recognized government established to 
which the people adhere within any exact and defined limits, and 
within which the authority of Spain is wholly suspended. The 
Cuban sway is altogether evanescent, and, so far as we have any evi- 
dence, it is the rule of the camp alone. Thus it is apparent that 
Cuba has not forced Spain to carry on regular war, nor has she or- 
ganized and founded a government that can be recognized. There 
is no civil power that has supplanted the Spanish authority, and which 
governs Cuba or any considerable part of the island, so it would be 
useless to recognize such an insurrection until it shall show it has 
"ability to maintain itself." Had Spanish rule passed entirely under 
the authority of Cuba, and had it also possession of the main part 
of the island with adequate power to conquer its rights against Spain, 
then foreign governments would be justified in recognizing the Re- 
public of Cuba as a reality. Then there must be a compact mass 
of population and combined effort by means of regular war, in order 
to warrant belligerent rights; and there must be a government 
established, in fact, which becomes supreme within certain fixed 
limits, and to which the people therein observe a uniform obedience 
before we can recognize it as a government de facto. Such is not 
the fact in Cuba, and we must wait until she places herself on justi- 
fiable grounds before the United States can recognize Cuba as a bel- 
ligerent. 

A State is a body politic, or society of men united together for 
promoting their mutual safety by their combined strength, and the 
civil power is that which governs and rules it. Civil society is 
instituted to preserve peace, and the State is warranted in the use 
of all the means to that end ; for the State is the complete body 
of free persons associated together to enjoy peacefully their rights, 
and for their common benefit, and war is justifiable when prose- 
cuted for the enforcement of those rights. It is necessary that 
there should be a public authority in the State, and that authority 
is the sovereignty ; and Spain is that sovereign power in Cuba, by 
Spanish discovery, settlement, succession, and by Spanish law; 
and that authority must remain until Spain is broken up, or Cuba 



10 

constitutes a new State m her place. The rights of nations spring 
from their obligations, and the nation remains until the political 
association is broken up; and if a period were put to this associa- 
tion, the State no longer subsists. Since a nation is obliged to 
preserve itself, it has a right to every necessary means to its pres- 
ervation. The law never obliges to impossibilities, nor prescribes 
as a duty what it debars us from fulfilling. So it gives the means 
to preserve the State. " The legal idea of a State necessarily im- 
plies that of the habitual obedience of its members to those per- 
sons in whom the superiority is vested ; and of a fixed abode and 
definite territory belonging to the people by whom it is occupied." 
Such is the view of Wheaton, and he adds : " There is an internal 
and external authority belonging to every State. The internal 
sovereignty is that which is inherent in the people of any State, 
vested by its constitution. External sovereignty consists in the 
independence of one political society in respect to all other political 
societies. Sovereignty, he further says, is acquired by a State, 
cither at the origin of the civil society of which it is composed, 
or when it separates itself from the community of which it pre- 
viously formed a part, and on which it was dependent. This prin- 
ciple applies as well to internal as external sovereignty. The ex- 
istence of a state de facto is sufficient in this re:-pect to establish 
its sovereignty^ jure. It is a State because it exists; but the 
external sovereignty may require recognition by other States, in 
order to render it complete. So long as the new State confines its 
actions to its own citizens, and to the limits of its own territory, 
it may well dispense with such recognition. But if it desires to 
enter into that great society of nations, all the members of which 
recognize rights to which they are mutually entitled, and duties' 
which they may be called upon reciprocally to fulfill, such recog- 
nition becomes essentially necessary to the complete participation 
of the new State in all the advantages of the society. 

" Every other State is at liberty to grant or refuse this recog- 
nition, subject to the consequences of its own conduct in this respect, 
and until such recognition becomes universal on the part of 
the other States, the new State becomes entitled to the exercise of 
its external sovereignty as to those States only by whom that 
sovereignty has been recognized." Such are principles laid down 
by Wheaton in his invaluable work upon the laws of nations, and 
applying these principles to the condition of Cuba, we have no 
facts on which to base recognition, either of an actual existing 
government, or of belligerent rights. Wheaton says that as to* its 
internal sovereignty it is a State because it exists. This is the law, 
and so we inquire, what is a State, which must first precede and 
establish its internal sovereignty ? According to the principles- 
of the law of nations, it either is an original or acquired sover- 
eignty. Under the Spanish law, Cuba is an appendage of Spain, 
and the entire sovereignty over Cuba inheres in Spain by the 
Spanish Constitution — that sovereignty never vested in Cuba, and- 



20 

that legal authority continues undiminished, until it is destroyed 
by some adequate power. Now, Cuba, not having the power to 
govern herself under their laws, she must first demolish that con- 
nection or dependence by adequate means, before she is in a con- 
dition to claim to be a State or power de facto. Here we apply 
another principle in Wheaton, that " the habitual obedience of the 
members of any political society to a superior authority must have 
once existed in order to constitute a sovereign State. But the 
temporary suspension of that obedience and of that authority, in 
consequence of a civil war, does not necessarily extinguish the 
being of that State, although it may affect, for a time, its ordinary 
relations with other States." 

Now it is allowed that Cuba is a mere dependency of Spain, and 
all its sovereign powder inheres in Spain, under Spanish law ; and so 
under that law Cuba can not acquire any internal or external 
sovereignty, except by revolution or concession. She must stand, 
therefore, on the right of revolution alone, and by force she must 
supplant Spanish rule in Cuba, and organize an existing de facto 
government in its place throughout Cuba, or the Spanish authority 
remains undisturbed. And, so far, this insurrection has not dis- 
turbed the ordinary relations of Spain with foreign States, and there 
is, as yet, but a limited suspension of Spanish authority in Cuba, and 
that disturbance has not yet risen in any part of the island to the 
condition described by Canning, " that a certain degree of force and 
consistency acquired by a mass of population engaged in war 1 ' is 
essential to entitle that population to be recognized as a belli- 
gerent. 

I. Then this insurrection has not that compact mass of population 
necessary to constitute and carry on war. 

II. It has not established a government to which the body of 
the people adhere, and hence it has not as yet acquired the consti- 
tutional element of a State or de facto government. 

III. The so-called Cuban Republic has no defined limits other 
than the natural limits of the island, within which Spain has ever 
had, and still possesses, the legal control, and actually occupies the 
same, with exceptional points. 

IY. So the Cuban Republic, by the very claim of its friends, is 
still a thing of the future, and not of the present. 

V. The United States are urged to recognize this Republic of 
Cuba when we know that Spanish authority has not ceased to hold 
any but inconsiderable portions of the islaud ; and we know that 
Cuba is herself adhering to the authority of Spain, at all points 
where the Revolutionary forces do not prevail ; and we further 
know that this pretended Cuban Constitution has never been 
authorized by the people, or any considerable part of them. 

VI. Hence the Republic of Cuba is not constituted in any 
actual sense by the population of the island, over which it 
claims to exist ; and has been set up by the Revolutionary leaders 
alone. 



21 

YII. Hence the Cuban Republic is not a State, because it do. s 
exist, for the insurrection is still raging, and one half of the Cubai s 
within these limits adhere to Spain and oppose the establishment cf 
this pretended State. 

VIII. So, it must be apparent that there is not a stable revolu- 
tionary government now existing in Cuba entitled to be recognized 
as a belligerent or a de facto power ; and we founded the precedents 
in the Texas revolution and. in that of Hungary, not to recognize 
such de facto governments until we had sufficient proofs that they 
were " stable" governments. 

Such was the language of Jackson and of Webster upon those 
occasions; and shall we now say that Cuba "has any elements of sta- 
bility, comparable to Texas and Hungary, and upon whom we con- 
ferred not the poor boon of recognition, while those battles for inde- 
pendence lasted, because the Government had not clear evidence 
that they had a :quired the necessary elements of a stable govern- 
ment? Against whom does Cuba, thus torn and distracted, wage 
war ? Not against Spain alone, but against one-half the population 
of that island ! She thus wasres an unequal contest. She has men, 
but not the sinews of war. She has neither a port nor city in her 
possession. She gets, necessarily, very inadequate supplies for her 
straggling forces. She has not a ship upon the seas, and yet she 
hopes to win her independence, and that against Spain, a nation of 
18,000,000 — whose army is disciplined — whose navy is quite equal 
to any after France and England in strength ! And yet these brave 
Cubans have the hardihood'to think that they can achieve their in- 
dependence. It is a courageous struggle, but any calculation of 
forces shows that they will yet be exhausted, and fail. Such, at. 
least, must be the conclusion which the American Government must 
reach, after our experience made in actual war. 

It might be also considered that we occupy a certain position 
touching this question of recognition of insurgents, known to all the 
world. Our record is historic, and can not be changed. It may 
be disregarded : it can not be hidden nor overlooked. Indeed, all 
the world knows of our war, and will not forget its lessons, and its 
changing events. The page of history has already inscribed its out- 
line, its grand proportions, its duration and end. We thus realize, 
in its expenditure and loss, that it is surpassed by no civil war in 
history. It almost approaches in magnitude the French Revolution, 
and if it did not shake Europe to the center, it certainly shattered 
American prosperity, and cost this people $4,000,000,000, while it 
emancipated 4,000,000 blacks. Such are some of the stupendous 
results of the American conflict, and yet our Government was main- 
tained during this tremendous contest, while we engaged the Con- 
federate forces with grand armies comprising a million of men, and 
while the insurgents gave laws to the South within the bounds of 
the Confederate'States for a period of nearly five years; and while 
we were forced to carry on regular war, upon land and sea, and 
compelled to observe all the rules of war known to equal States — 



22 

.exchanging prisoners and establishing a blockade, and making prize 
of war — yet during all this terrible and desolating conflict, in which 
perished 500,000 men, we ever maintained that the States of Europe, 
in an unfriendly, and in an unseemly and hasty manner, unwar- 
rantably recognized the South as a belligerent in war. The Foreign 
Office fairly groaned with the complaints we sent out to Europe upon 
that occasion ; and yet there are men in our Congress who sustained 
these complaints against England, and would thus suddenly become 
oblivious to this historic act of our Government, and in " hot haste" 
recognize a phantom republic that has no actual existence except 
in their heated brain ! Such a course must meet the disapproval of 
statesmen. It is unsustainable, and lays us open to lively censure 
and want of faith, if not of truth, in our course toward the States of 
Europe. Better that we pause before we subject ourselves to such 
criticism. A nation must preserve its consistency and its honor. 
Those deceive themselves who do not see that this whole Cuban 
recognition would obliterate all that we have done during our late 
war. If there be any statesmen who would have Cuba become in- 
dependent by our aid and our recognition of her as a belligerent, he 
must allow it would be accomplished at the price of American jus- 
tice and honor. It would bode little good to argue with those who 
can not discover that while Cuba might be pronounced a da facto 
power, it would be at the expense of our good name. 

President Grant has thus saved us, and it is to be hoped that 
Congress will see the wisdom of following the example he has thus 
set, in spite of the temptation that beset us to intercede and give 
aid to the revolted Cuhans, and thereby shake the hold Spain now 
has upon the gem of the Antilles. But our disinterested course, 
thus far taken, will, if pursued, be a coveted gem to the model Re- 
public that will never dim its radiance, even when shone upon by 
the united splendor of all the costly jewels that now dazzle the 
crowned heads of Europe. The costly jewels that gleam to our 
sight pale their splendor amid the steady and radiant light of an 
heroic and disinterested action ; and under what a dazzling panoply 
do a people live, w T hen they can look back into history and say that 
the Republic was ever just and disinterested ! Let our Republic rise 
up to this grandeur, and it will endure and live, and bring the 
human race to constitutional government by the mere force of its 
example. 

It thus appears that Cuba, so far from being in a condition to be 
recognized as a belligerent, is not yet a de facto power, with a fixed 
abode and definite limits. It assumes to speak in the name of a 
Cuban Republic ; but who has ever heard when and how, and by 
whom, that Republic was constituted, for and in behalf of the island 
of Cuba? Its adoption in camp, and its affirmation by the Cuban 
Junta, is about all there is of this Cuban Republic. It lias not re- 
ceived the sanction of the people of Cuba, and hence its claims to 
be founded by the people of that island must wholly disappear. 
The Cuban Republic is the work of a cabal, and altogether without 



23 

republican sanctions. It has never been submitted to the people 
for adoption, and its constitution was not framed with their sanc- 
tion. This work has been done arbitrarily by a self-constituted 
revolutionary body, and can not appeal to us for approval under 
these circumstances. It has thus been set up by the connivance 
and deceit of a Cuban Junta, and adopted by the revolutionary 
body that follows the camp of Cespedes. Such is the Cuban Re- 
public that pretends to exist and have a being in the island of 
Cuba ; and to recognize that Republic, we must sanction this fraud 
upon republicanism, and say that it has internal sovereignty and 
the adhesion of the people of Cuba, when there are no legal and 
formal sanctions sustaining that conclusion. Did we see a republic 
rising up amidst the Antilles, with all the usual sanctions essen- 
tial to that form, and with a prospect of some stability, it would 
necessarily appeal to our sympathies and moral support, although 
we would be still under the obligations of neutrality. But this 
Cuban Republic has not yet risen up, nor has it yet shown it 
has been either founded or approved by the people of Cuba, in any 
manner sanctioned by American forms and American law. 

Cuba, being still a dependency of Spain, in every accepted sense, 
and not having shaken off Spanish authority and established a 
government entitling it to be recognized by sovereign powers, it 
has not yet attained that position that entitles it to appeal to 
the laws of nations for support, either as a belligerent, or as a de 
facto power; for it is an undoubted principle that none but 
sovereign powers can avail themselves of the laws of nations. 
States are the sole parties that constitute international law ; and 
none but independent States can avail themselves of this great 
code. 

So we can have no intercourse with Cuba until she attain the 
position of a de facto power. She must first make this appear 
oy facts. She can not claim recognition until she abolishes and 
expels Spanish rule, and establishes a government that has the 
sanction of the people within the entire limits of this pretended 
Republic; for it would be an absurdity for foreign States to recog- 
nize a republican government in Cuba when such government had 
never received the sanction of the people of Cuba, or any part of 
them. 

I. It thus appears that the people of Cuba have not yet ratified 
the Republic in any manner. 

II. It appears that this Cuban Republic has no fixed limits, sanc- 
tioned by the laws of war and of revolution ; that its extension, over 
the entire island is not pretended ; that it actually exists in the 
Eastern Departments alone. 

III. And yet we are urged, notwithstanding these facts, to 
acknowledge the existence of a government that has not yet sus- 
tained its own pretensions, nor made good its asserted authority 
over the island of Cuba. 

IV. And thus we say that the grounds upon which we are urged 



24 

to recognize Cuba as a Republic, or existing power, are not sus- 
tained and do not warrant such recognition. 

Besides, the recognition of belligerent rights in a colony or por- 
tion of a State in revolt to the parent State, and against an equal 
half of that colony who remain loyal to the State, is not to be con- 
founded with the acknowledgment of the independence of that 
colony, when its aggregated population have unitedly resolved on in- 
dependence and taken up arms to sustain the declaration. That Avas 
the case with the thirteen colonies in the Revolution. Had the thir- 
teen colonies been about equally divided, would not foreign States 
have long hesitated to recognize us as belligerents, or as an independ- 
ent po^er? How can foreign States make such recognition until 
the new State or power becomes a fact ; and bow can they pronounce 
that a community, equally divided, is to be subjected to a recogni- 
tion of the insurgent pow T er? This is confounding all ideas of the 
essential facts necessary to constitute a status of belligerency ; and 
hence the absolute requirement that we should wait the further 
developments of this struggle before Cuba can be justly recognized 
as a de facto power. 

IV. MONKOE DECLARATION CONSIDERED. 

Louis XYI. invoked the crowned heads of Europe to intervene 
in France, and keep him on his throne. That alliance was un- 
availing. The Republic then, like a portentous meteor, passed over 
Europe^ and was lest in the Empire. Both appeared in the ascend- 
ant for a while. Intervention finally triumphed ; and Europe 
was subdivided by the allies. Ihis intervention was then directed 
against France. After this came the division of spoils, then the 
h" ve great powers— Russia, England, France, Prussia, and Austria — 
constituted the league, called the Holy Alliance, and announced 
to the world that these — 

" Powers have unitedly the right to take precautionary measures 
in common, were it only for the sake of example against those 
States where the political changes produced by rebellion are hostile 
to legitimate government." 

The next congress of sovereigns declared against the revolution 
in Naples; and at Lay bach they procl aimed that tbey would not 
suffer in any country a political establishment antagonistic to the 
principle of monarchical legitimacy — that they did not in any 
manner recognize the new order of things existing in Naples, and 
they decided" that the king (Ferdinand) should be reinstated. 

In 1821, these sovereigns proclaimed that "useful and necessary 
changes in the legislation and administration of States should 
emanate alone from the free will and the mature and enlightened 
impulsion of those whom God has rendered responsible and in- 
trusted with power. All action aside from this course must lead to 
disorder and perturbation, to evils much more intolerable than those 
which it is attempted to remedy." They also decided that, while 



25 

respecting the rights and independence of every hg'timate power, 
they would consider as legally void and inconsistent with the public 
right of Europe any assumed reform effected by revolt and open 
force. 

At Verona, it was no longer a question of Naples, but of Spain, 
which had set up a new constitution under the rule of the Cortes. 
Under its sanction a French army invaded Spain, and overthrew 
that constitution, and reinvested Ferdinand with legitimate power 
under the sanction of all the allies but England. 

Finally, Prince Metternich assured the restored king of Spain, in 
1 eh alf of Austria, that some of the august allies, being faithful to 
the system of conservation and peace, will not cease to consider 
" all disorder and pertut nations, whichever part of Europe may 
suffer ly them, as a subject of lively solicitude to all the govern- 
'merits? 

Thus it was distinctly intimated that Austria would aid Spain to 
recover her South American colonies that had already achieved 
their actual independence ; and thereupon Spain invited the great 
powers to meet at Paris to consider the project of recovering her 
lost sovereignty over these new American States. And thus this 
continent was threatened with the intervention of the allied powers 
of Europe. These Spanish colonies, at the instance of Napoleon, 
as it is suspected, early resolved upon independence, and they had 
successfully achieved it; and in 1822, Spanish authority had wholly 
disappeared from that part of the world. But a new intervention 
now threatened to resubject them to the authority of Spain. 

At this juncture, Lord Castlereagh stated to Mr. Push, the 
American minister at London, that he could not agree to recon- 
ciliation between Spain and her colonies, unless based upon their 
entire submission to the mother country. But his death made 
Canning prime minister, and he severed England from the alliance. 
Canning advised France that England considered that events had 
already decided the question of the separation of the colonies from 
Spain.' In August, 1823, Mr. Push replied to the note of Canning 
that his country desired to see these States received into the family 
of nations by the powers of Europe, and especially by Great Britain, 
and he added that the sentiments expressed by Canning were shared 
by the United States, who considered the recovery of the colonies 
of Spain to be entirely hopeless, and would regard as highly unjust, 
and fruitful of disastrous consequences, any attempt on the part of 
any European power to take possession of them by conquest, by 
cession, or on any other ground or pretext whatever. 

Mr. Canning, writing "to Vienna, in 1823, with a view of emphat- 
ically expressing the dissent of England to the interference of any 
other powers, by force or menace, in the internal concerns of inde- 
pendent States, said : — 

" The allies have no right, under the alliance, to call upon us to 
aid or abet a forcible interference in the internal affairs of any 
country, for the purpose or under the pretext of putting down 



26 

« 

extravagant theories of liberty. But we have a right to call upon 
them, as they upon us, to check the aggression of State against 
State, and to preserve the territorial balance of Europe." 

In writing to Madrid, he said, " While I was yet hesitating what 
shape to give to the declaration and protest, which ultimately was 
conveyed in my conference with the Prince de Polignac, and while 
I was more doubtful as to the effect of that protest and declaration, 
I sounded Mr. Rush as to his power and disposition to join in any 
step which we might take to prevent a hostile enterprise on the 
part of European powers against Spanish America. He had no 
powers, but he would have taken upon himself to join with us, if 
we would have begun by recognizing the Spanish American States. 
This we could not do, but I have no doubt that his report to his 
government of this sounding (which he probably represented as an 
overture) had a great share in producing the official declaration of 
the President." 

Thus we must, after the full explanation of Mr. Calhoun, made 
in his speech upon the occupation of Yucatan, in 1848, relative to 
this event, award Mr. Canning the credit of this great and emphatic 
declaration made in the message of Mr. Monroe. Mr. Monroe con- 
sulted Mr. Jefferson, and he answered the President in October, 
1823, after being advised of the position of affairs, that " our first 
and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in 
the broils of Europe ; our second, never to suffer Europe to inter- 
meddle with cis- Atlantic affairs." Thus fortified by sage counsel 
and the promise of Great Britain, the President, in his message in 
December, 1823, finally announced the principles, now recognized 
distinctively as the "Monroe Doctrine," and which are in sub- 
stance : — 

I. That the American Continents are not henceforth to be con- 
sidered subject to any future colonization by any State of Europe. 

II. That the political system of the allied powers is essentially dif- 
ferent from that of America ; and we should consider any attempt 
on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemi- 
sphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. 

III. That in the wars of Europe relating to themselves, we have 
never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so ; 
and it is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced, 
that we resent injuries, or make preparation for defense. With the 
movements of this hemisphere we are necessarily and immediately 
connected ; hut with the existing colonies or dependencies of any 
European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. 

IV. And with the governments who have declared their indepen- 
dence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on 
great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged, we could 
not view any interposition for the purposes of oppressing them, or 
controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European 
power, in any other light than of the manifestation of an unfriendly 
disposition toward the United States. 



27 

Mr. Monroe further said that in the war between these govern- 
ments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their re- 
cognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, 
provided no change shall occur, which shall make a corresponding 
change, on the part of the United States, indispensable to their se- 
curity. 

The declaration against the intervention of the allied powers 
found strong support among the liberals of Europe, and especially 
in Great Britain who had so recently withdrawn from the alliance. 
The Ministry and the Opposition in Parliament united in pro- 
nouncing in favor of that part of the Message. Brougham " declared 
that no occasion had ever created greater joy, exultation, and grati- 
tude among all the free men of Europe ; that he felt a pride in be- 
ing connected by blood and language with the people of the United 
States ; that the feeling disclosed by the Message became a great, a 
free, and an independent nation ; and that he hoped his own coun- 
try would be prevented by no mean pride, or party jealousy, from 
following so noble and glorious an example." 

Sir James Mackintosh said that it was not foreign to his argu- 
ment urging the recognition of these new States in Parliament, to 
turn aside tor a few moments ''to consider the admirable Message 
sent on the 2d of December, 1823, by the President of the United 
States to the Congress of that great Kepublio. I heartily rejoice," 
he said, " in the perfect agreement of that Message with the prin- 
ciples professed by us to the French Minister, and afterward to all 
the great powers of Europe, whether military or maritime, and to 
the great English State beyond the Atlantic. I am not anxious to 
ascertain whether the Message was influenced by our communica- 
tion, or was the mere result of similarity of principle and coinci- 
dence of interest. Above all, sir, there is one coincidence between 
them, which is, I trust, of happy augury to the whole civilized 
world— they have both declared their neutrality in the American 
contest as long as it shall be confined to Spain and her former 
colonies, or as long as no foreign power shall interfere" 

Mr. Calhoun said, " that the members of the Alliance held several 
congresses, attended either by themselves or their embassadors, 
and undertook to regulate the'affairs of all Europe, and actually in- 
terfered in the affairs of Spain for the purpose of putting down 
popular doctrines. In its progress the Alliance turned its eyes to 
this continent in order to aid Spain in regaining her sovereignty 
over her revolted provinces. At this time England became al armed. ; 
Mr. Canning was her prime minister. He informed Mr. Push of 
the project, "and gave to him, at the same time, the assurance that 
if sustained by the United States, Great Britain would resist, Mr. 
Knsh immediately communicated this to our Government. It was 
received here with joy ; for so great was the power of the Alliance, 
that even we did not feel ourselves safe from its interpositions. 
I well recollect the great satisfaction with which it was received 
by the Cabinet. It came late in the year, not long before 



28 

the meeting of Congress. As was usual with Mr. Monroe upon 
great occasions, the papers were sent round to each member of the 
Cabinet, so that each might be duly apprised of all the circumstances, 
and be prepared to give his opinion. The Cabinet met. It delib- 
erated. There was long and careful consideration ; and the result, 
the declaration which I have just announced. All this has passed 
away. That very movement on the part of England, sustained by 
this declaration, gave a blow to the celebrated Alliance from which 
it never recovered. From that time forward it gradually decayed, 
till it utterly perished, The late revolutions in Europe have put an 
end to all its work, and nothing remained of all it ever did." Mr. 
Calhoun added that England delayed recognition fearing a war 
with the allied powers. Thus conjointly these two countries avert- 
ed all European interference on the American continent, in 1823, 
and saved the South American republics. Finally, Mr. Canning 
recognized them, and called the new States into existence to redress 
the balance of the old, as he somewhat boastingly declared. 

Mr. Canning resolutely protested against that part which de- 
clared against occupying and colonizing any part of this Ameri- 
can continent by any European State ; and he held that we had no 
right to take umbrage at the establishment of such colonies from 
Europe in any such unoccupied parts. Columbia after this took 
the lead to form an alliance of all the American States, upon this 
basis, by a proposed congress at Panama. This was favored by Mr. 
Adams, and opposed by the opposition to his administration, and 
Congress refused to sustain this declaration, and thus the proposed 
alliance was notformed and we were not represented in that congress. 
It may here be said, that it was suspected that France was to be 
compensated by the cession of Cuba, and it was rumored as a con- 
sequence that England was about to seize Cuba, to prevent this 
transfer. In the mean time, Cuba became alarmed, and while some 
favored English protection, others sought the aid of the United 
States. A secret agent was sent from Cuba to see Mr. Monroe, and 
propose that the island would declare itself independent of Spain, 
provided the United States would protect them, and finally receive 
Cuba into the Union. Mr. Monroe replied that the friendly rela- 
tions existing between us and Spain did not permit us to promise 
protection to insurrectionary movements, and advised the people of 
Cuba to adhere to Spain, declaring that any interference by France 
or England in Cuba would place our relations to Cuba in a different 
position. Mr. Canning disclaimed any such purpose, and said that 
he would oppose any interference in Cuba by us or France. He then 
proposed that an understanding should be had by the three powers 
disclaiming any purpose to interfere with Cuba, to which Mr. Mon- 
roe acceded, and left England to negotiate with France to that end. 

Such is an imperfect outline of events that accompanied this 
declaration of what is now compendiously called the Monroe doc- 
trine. We will now consider with brevity whether this doctrine is 
founded upon principle such as America ever has sustained. 



29 

Mr. Calhoun says that the part relating to colonization is not pre- 
cise and accurate ; and was the part not considered in the cabinet. 
It originated with Mr. Adams, and grew out of the boundary qnes- 
tion, in which Kussia claimed disputed territory of the Northwest, 
claimed equally by us and England. Mr. Dana, in a copious note 
to Wheaton, says that this part of the declaration was intended to 
assert that this continent was all occupied by civilized nations and no 
longer open to colonization except upon that footing alone. Mr. Cal- 
houn held this part a declaration larger than the fact, and this country 
has never in any manner sustained it. Our own title was founded on 
discovery and revolution. We had but a small part of the continent. 
We held it by the same title that Great Britain still holds British Amer- 
ica. W r e have never interfered with the actual colonization of any part 
of this continent by any European State ; and nearly all European 
States possess colonies in this hemisphere and have colonized them 
ever since with the same right that we have drawn immigration to 
settle in our own country. There is no principle of public law that can 
sustain this part of the Monroe doctrine, except in that limited sense 
that the entire continent was no longer open to future claims of dis- 
covery and settlement upon such a title. In that sense it was 
hardly intended. We can not make public law any more than 
the allied sovereigns, and we never assumed that any part of 
this hemisphere was not to be transferred by any European State 
except in the case of Cuba alone, and that has been put clearly 
on the ground that Cuba thus transferred to any great State, 
would endanger American interests and American commerce. That 
is the extent of our claim to restrict the transfer of American soil. 

As to the main declaration to which all the others were merely 
incidents, it had a decided effect upon the affairs of the New World, 
and was proclaimed in self-defense, and to avert the allies from 
repressing tree States upon this continent. The Monroe declaration 
was the result of the irresistible progress of events. It was the 
assertion of the right of an independent nation; and we were ex- 
posed to be by them repressed as a dangerous example : as a State 
that had risen by a flagrant rebellion. 

These powers undertook to change the public law of the world 
by a mere league — undertook to put down all revolutions in States 
not sanctioned by them, and thus we may say with Mr. Webster, 
that while the teachings of Laybach gave the rule, there was no law 
but the law of the strongest. Here we stood, the defender of the 
rights of free nations. 

By what right could the great powers impose their will upon 
other nations, except by mere brute force, and by what right could 
they overturn free government in Spain, in Naples, and other 
nations, not parties to the compact ? By the same right other nations 
could destroy arbitrary power, and these monarchies. Finally we 
declined to enter into the proposed alliance, at Panama, in 1826, in 
defense of the free American States, because it would seemingly 
justify this alliance of despots. It was justly said, however, that 



30 

this congress was proposed, strictly on the defensive and not for the 
purpose of aggression — not for the purpose of propagating freedom, 
not for the end to suppress despotic rale. Finally we may say, 
with Mr. Calhoun, that these declarations were the mere declara- 
tions of the executive department, which were never approved 
and adopted by Congress. They can not be dignified as having 
been reduced to an American policy. ki They are but declarations 
and nothing more." Still they have exerted wide influence upon 
the country, and commend themselves in the main to popular favor ; 
but they are things entirely of the past, as the Alliance against 
which they were made. That Alliance no longer exists ; and it was 
against the principles of that Alliance being extended to America 
that we resisted, and which caused this celebrated declaration. It 
was not an assertion of any form of government, but the right to 
change government, which we asserted. That was the issue met 
and embodied in the Monroe declaration, so it was not antagonistic 
to any separate State, but to the allied powers alone. Thus we 
must keep within the limits of the actual declaration. 

But applying these principles they do not permit us to interfere 
in any manner with existing colonies of European States on these 
continents, except as independent States may of right do in pre- 
serving a strict neutrality. It is further apparent that the United 
States, being so immediately connected with such colonies, will ever 
feel a lively interest in their welfare, and when they maintain their 
independence will ever be first to welcome them into the family of 
nations. That has been the uniform course of our Government, 
whether these new States arise in Europe or America, and should 
Cuba achieve her independence, we will thus recognize her as an in- 
dependent State, and the enlightened nations will sanction it, while 
Spain will have no cause to complain. 

In the mean time, we must allow that Spain is deeply interested 
in the retention of this valuable island, which is justly hers, and 
which adds much to her national strength. It is an island rich 
with all the products of a tropical clime, producing the finest quali- 
ties of tobacco and sugar, as primary staples. No island is more 
rich, none other has such fertile soil. The unchanging climate alone 
keeps it from being the paradise of the world. Its extension from 
east to west is about 750 miles, with an area of 45,000 square miles. 
Within these limits are plantations, in point of wealth, nowhere 
else seen. The people are not generally advanced not having risen 
above their seclusion. The better classes possess all the amenities 
and many of the attainments of the great Spanish race from which 
they are descended. In full view of these ties of interest and of 
blood, it is obvious that Spain will not readily give up a contest that 
involves the loss of Cuba. Spain has a well-appointed army, and 
a navy that stands third in the list of maritime States. Besides, 
she is a resolute State, never counting the cost, notwithstanding 
her thousand disasters. She believes that to deserve to succeed is 
equal to success. 



31 

Having thus lived through a thousand years, and feeling that 
her foot still rests upon the Pyrenees, while her battles have dotted 
the map of Europe with her former renown, the Spanish Llood 
still beats warm for the preservation of the State, and the reten- 
tion of her ancient and long-cherished jewels, many of which have 
dropped from her casket. Cuba remains the jewel of the sea; and 
she means that it shall not be unseemly clutched from her pos- 
session. 

It now remains to be seen whether Spain, while she hurls upon 
this island the thunders of war and the missiles of destruction, will 
pursue the contest with a humane and magnanimous spirit. She 
may, as did this country, at the opening of our civil war, be too 
much inclined to visit with severity the penalty of rebellion upon 
individual men. If that be her purpose, it is worse than a mistake. 
There is no crime in the rebellion of a people. The leaders alone 
should be visited with punishment, aud that in no sanguinary 
manner. During the American war, to its very close, there was no 
life taken for the crime of rebellion; and Burke said he could not 
draw up an indictment against a great people ; and this age approves 
the sentiment. But Spain has now a golden opportunity to stay 
the hand of vengeance, while she prostrates this insurrection. Her 
revolutionary government at home, with the men who guide and 
administer it, are pledges that Cubans will be humanely dealt 
with, and will be given all their just and equal rights. At least 
it is not our province, at this juncture, to intermeddle in this 
contest, and we have shown that the Monroe doctrine constrains 
us to resist all intervention by foreign States while we must 
preserve a just neutrality in these contests between the parent 
State and the rebellious colony. "We say that is a consequence of 
the Monroe doctrine, if extended to the islands, as well as the con- 
tinent, of America. We do not raise the question that these islands 
were not embraced in the message of Mr. Monroe ; but the prin- 
ciple is the same, and made applicable by the same necessity. We 
are thus pledged in good faith by that language to carry out those 
principles which we have denominated American doctrines : Non- 
interference with existing colonies of European States upon the 
American continent. 

But it is said that this policy conflicts with our interest, and that 
we should aid Cuba in gaining her independence. We are told 
that Cuba should belong to the United States, or, at least, it should 
be free. To this we answer, that, while there is no evidence that 
the Cubans desire to be annexed, we need not discuss that part. 
At the same time, we are in favor of awaiting the logic of events, 
and not forestalling them. The mere recognition of Cuba would 
not give her independence, and if she fails we should have the 
humiliation of doing a hasty act with unjustifiable motives, and we 
should thus lose the friendship of Spain, and be in no condition 
thereafter to intercede for the Cubans, or to acquire the island from 
Spain by a voluntary cession. We should thus overact and defeat 



all hopes of future acquisition of this island. Besides, the United 
States have already expanded their domain to thrice its original size, 
and all this territory came directly from voluntary cessions. A 
policy that has thus absorbed in the past such an empire of Spanish 
soil, stands invigorated and commended to American statesmen by 
its vast results. We have already planted the American flag by a 
peaceful policy upon the second island of the Antilles, and it is 
quite obvious that this island will soon be ours, and it will be gained 
and made valuable to us through the arts of peace, and with this 
splendid island we should be content. Thus we shall become pos- 
sessed of the finest harbor in the "West Indies, and will thus approx- 
imate nearer to Spain. Especially, then, we must maintain good 
neighborhood with Spain, and not try to weaken her while she is 
now advancing to free constitutional government. Besides, it is our 
interest to strengthen Spain, and make her an ally for the mastery 
of the seas. We need her strength and friendship to offset the 
power of England. And with her we may thus advance liberal 
governments and sustain an old, but now a second-class power. 
With us Spain may repair her strength. For these reasons we say 
that the United States sustain such relations to Spain that it is not 
for us to recognize the insurgents, but wait till the Cuban Republic 
shall become a de facto poiver, with ability to maintain herself; 
and then, and not before, w T e may justly recognize her as a belliger- 
ent power. 

Besides, we are not wanting in territorial expansion. We have a vast 
and extended domain stretching from ocean to ocean, with a vast 
breadth of latitude, adequate to all our wants for the next century. Upon 
our present domain a population of 300,000,000 can be sustained. 
Moreover, there is a predominating tendency to expansion of 
the Republic in the ratio of our growth, and this primordial law 
will give continued extension until we shall become the Republic 
of North America, and this will be accomplished quite as rapidly as 
it can be advantageous to the Nation without violation of National 
faith and a resort to questionable expedients. Our danger lies in 
too rapid an expansion and thereby weakening onr power of 
assimilation and cohesion. All great and powerful nations have 
this ambition to extension, and we misread history if this very vice 
does not in the end become a primal cause of their decline and fall. 
This Republic will expand. Its people are only too sanguine in this. 
They see in it vast power, wealth, and our god Terminus will not 
recede ; but advance as Rome grew. We know there is no resist- 
ing this law of our expansion ; but we must equally heed our dan- 
gers from within. Greatness brings all the vices and corruption, and 
in our ambition we may depart, like the Romans, from the virtues 
of the Republic. We most require at this time ample extension of 
the social and civilizing forces, that ought to characterize a great 
Republic Extend the?e, and then we may a similate all conflicting 
forces, and long stand as a nation. 



33 

RECOGNITION OF NEW STATES, AND AMERICAN 
POLICY; CONFEDERATE STATES. 

Mk. Fish to Mr. Motley, Sept. 25, 1869. 

"Did such a bare commencement of hostilities constitute belligerency? Clearly not. 
It was a step, therefore, to be taken with thoughtfulness, and with a due regard to exi- 
gent circumstances. Governments have waited months, sometimes years, in the face of 
actual hostility without taking this step. 

" The law of nations was the true and proper duty for the government. As to Great 
Britain, we had special and peculiar causes for grief. She had prematurely, as we 
deemed it, and without adequate reason, awarded the status of belligerency to our insur- 
gents. We complain that by reason of the policy and acts of the Queen's ministers, 
injury incalculable was inflicted on the United States." 

Mr. Seward to Adams, April 10, 1861. 

" We freely admit that a nation may, and even ought to, recognize a new State which 
has absolutely, and beyond question, effected its independence and permanently estab- 
lish its sovereignty, and that a recognition in such case affords no just cause of offense 
to the government of the country from which the new State has so detached itself. On 
the other hand, we insist that a nation that recognizes a revolutionary State, with a vipw 
to aid its effecting its sovereignty and independence, commits a great wrong against the 
nation whose integrity is thus invaded, and makes itself responsible for a just and 
ample redress." 

Mr. Seward to Adams, June 19, 1861. 

" The United States are still solely and exclusively sovereign within the territories 
they have lawfully acquired and long possessed, as they have always been. They are 
at peace with all the world, as, with unimportant exceptions, they have always been. 
They are living under the obligations of the law of nations, and of treaties with Great 
Britain just the same now as heretofore ; they are, of course, the friend of Great Britain, 
and they insist that Great Britain shall remain their friend now, just as she has hitherto 
been. Great Britain, by virtue of these relations, is a stranger to parties and sections 
in this country, whether they are loval to the United States or not, and Great Britain 
can neither rightfully qualify the sovereignty of the United States, nor concede, nor 
recognize, any rights or interests, or power of any party, State, or section, in contraven- 
tion \o the unbroken sovereignty of the Federal Union. What is now seen in this coun- 
try is by no means peculiar, but frequent in all countries, more frequent even in Great 
Britain than here, of an armed insurrection engaged in attempting to overthrow the regu- 
larly constituted and established government. There is, of course, the employment of 
force by the government to suppress the insurrection, as every other government neces- 
sarily employs force in such cases. But these incidents by no means constitute a state 
of war impairing the sovereignty of the government, creating belligerent sections, and 
entitling foreign States to intervene or to act as neutrals between them, or in any other 
way to cast off their lawful obligations to the nation thus for the moment disturbed. 
Any other principle than this would be to resolve government everywhere into a thing 
of accident and caprice, and ultimately all human society into a state of perpetual war." 

Danas " Wheaton," foot-note, page 35. 
'• If the contest is a war, all foreign citizens and officers, whether executive or judi- 
cial, are to follow one line of conduct. If it is not a war, they are to follow a totally 
different line. If it is a war, the commissioned cruisers of both sides may stop, search, 
and capture the foreign merchant- vessel ; and that vessel must make no resistance, and 
must submit to adjudication by a prize court. If it is not a war, the cruisers of neither 
party can stop or search the foreign merchant-vessel ; and that vessel may resist all 
attempts in that direction, and the ships of war of the foreign State may attack and 
capture any cruiser persisting in the attempt. If it is war, foreign nations must 
await the adjudication of prize tribunals. If it is not war, no such tribunal can be 
opened. If it is a war, the parent State may institute a blockade jure gentium of the 
insurgent ports, which foreigners must respect; but if it is not a war, foreign nations 
having large commercial intercourse with the country will not respect a closing of 
insurgent ports by paper decrees only. If it is a war, the insurgent cruisers are to be 
treated by foreign citizens and officials, at sea and in port, as lawful belligerents. If 
it is not a war, those cruisers are pirates, and may be treated as such. If it is a war, 
the rules and risks respecting carrying contraband or dispatches or military persons 
come into play. If it is not a war, they do not. Within foreign jurisdiction, if it is a 
war, acts of the insurgents, in the way of preparation and equipments for hostility, may 
3 



34 



LIBRARY OF CONGREj 



015 992 007 



be breaches of neutrality laws ; while if it is not a war, they do not come into that 
category, but into the category of piracy or of crimes by municipal law." Foot-note to 
page 36, Mr. Dana says, speaking of belligerent recognition of insurgents : " All private 
citizens of a foreign State, and all its executive officers and judicial magistrates look to 
the political department of their government to prescribe the rule of their conduct in all 
their possible relations to the parties in the contest." Mr. William Beach Lawrence, 
one of the wisest and most careful writers on international law which the United States 
has produced, says in his own foot-note to Wheaton, that " it belongs exclusively to 
the political department of the government to recognize, or to refuse to recognize, a 
government in a foreign country claiming to have displaced the old and established a 
new one." 

Webster to Hulseman. 

" Mr. Mann's errand was, in the first instance, purely one of inquiry. He had no 
power to act, unless he had first come to the conviction that a firm and stable govern- 
ment existed. * * * It was only in the event that the new government should 
appear, in the opinion of the agent, to be firm and stable, that the President projwsed to 
recommend its recognition. * * * But the American government sought for nothing 
but truth; it desired to learn the facts through a reliable channel. It so happened, in 
the chances and vicissitudes of human affairs, that the result was adverse to the Hun- 
garian revolution." 

Webster on the Independence of Texas. 

" In the events leading to the actual result of these hostilities, the United States had 
no agency and took no part. Its government had, from the first, abstained from giving 
aid or succor to either party. It knew its neutral obligations and fairly endeavored 
to fulfill them all. It acknowledged the independence of Texas only when that independ- 
ence was an apparent and an ascertained fact." — Vol. VI., Webster's Works, p. 449. 

Mr. Clay on the Greek Revolution. 

" The rule we have ever followed has been this: to look at the state of the fact, and 
to recognize, be it what it might, which was in actual possession of sovereign power. 
When one government is overthrown, and another is established on its ruins, without 
embarrassing ourselves with any of the principles involved in the contest, we have ever 
acknowledged the new and actual government as soon as it had undisputed existence. 
Our simple inquiry has been, is there a government de facto." — Vol. I., Clay's Speeches. 
p. 435. 

Mr. Clay's Speech on Emancipation of South America. 

" Whatever form of government any society of people adopts, whoever they acknowl- 
edge as their sovereign, we consider that government or that sovereign as the one to be 
acknowledged by us. . . . And, so far as we are concerned, the sovereign de facto 
is the sovereign de jure. . . . I do not maintain that every immature revolution, 
every usurper before his power is consolidated, is to be acknowledged by us ; but that 
as soon as stability and order are maintained, no matter by whom, we always have con- 
sidered, and ought to consider, the actual the true government. General Washington, 
Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, all, while the}' were respectively Presidents, acted on these 
principles. 

" If, then, there be an established government in Spanish America, deserving to rank 
among the nations, we are morally and politically bound to acknowledge it, unless we 
renounce all the principles which ought to guide, and which hitherto have guided our 
councils. Rio de la Plata possesses such a government. Its limits, extending from 
the South Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, embrace a territory equal to that of the United 
States, certainly equal to it exclusive of Louisiana, Its population is about three 
millions, more than equal to ours at the,' commencement of our Revolution. . . . Not 
a Spanish bayonet remains within the immense extent of the territories of the La Plata, 
to contest the authority of the actual government, It is free,, it is independent, it is 
sovereign." And yet it was two years later before Congress recognized this power. 

Mr. Sumner on Alabama Claims, 1868. 

" Between two established powers," said Mr. Sumner, in his famous speech, delivered 
in the United States Senate, on the 14th of April, 1869, " both independent, there can be 
neutrality ; but where the one is nothing but an odious combination of rebels, to pro- 
claim neutrality is to mistake the name. The neutrality proclaimed by the Queen of 
England, in May, 1861, was the cause of nearly all the evils of the war; it placed the 
rebels in the position of an independent State ; it encouraged them to persevere in trea- 
son; it accorded them rights which they had not." 



